"Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power."
Abraham Licoln
Prof. Dr. Carmelo Borrego
Introduction
Within the framework of the event organized by the American Association of Jurists, entitled “The Defense of the International Order against Fascism,” held in São Paulo, Brazil, I addressed one of the most urgent issues in contemporary international law: unilateral coercive measures, also referred to by some political and social sectors as measures of extortion. [1]
This intervention sought to offer a legal reflection on the legality, illegality, and international consequences of measures adopted unilaterally by certain States, as well as on the responsibility that may arise from their imposition, implementation, and extraterritorial enforcement.
The issue is not merely terminological. The use of expressions such as economic sanctions, restrictive measures, unilateral coercive measures, or extortion reflects different political and legal approaches to the same phenomenon: the use of economic, financial, commercial, technological, diplomatic, or administrative instruments for the purpose of modifying the conduct of another State, its authorities, or certain sectors of its population, without authorization from the United Nations Security Council and outside a previously established international jurisdictional framework.
The central question is whether a State may, through its domestic legislation, impose restrictions that produce effects beyond its territory; compel third States and foreign individuals to comply with its decisions; block assets; restrict essential transactions; or prevent access to goods indispensable to a country’s population. The answer requires confronting such practices with the structural principles of the international order, including the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention, the prohibition of the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and the prohibition of certain conduct contrary to peremptory norms of international law.
The thesis is that measures of extortion cannot be presumed lawful merely because they were adopted through a national legislative or administrative act. Their validity must be assessed in light of applicable international law. When such measures disregard international obligations, produce illegitimate extraterritorial effects, disproportionately affect the population, or are used as a mechanism of political pressure incompatible with the sovereignty of another State, they may constitute internationally wrongful acts and generate legal consequences for the State adopting them and, in certain circumstances, for those who implement or facilitate them.
It should be added that this is not the first time I have addressed this type of international case. This same blog already contains an article related to the subject, corresponding to a lecture delivered at a side event before the UN Human Rights Council. See: https://www.dipcasosinternacionales.org/2024/11/las-medidas-coercitivasindividuales-o.html.
1. Legal Nature of Unilateral Measures of Extortion
Unilateral measures of extortion generally have their formal origin in the domestic law of States. They may be established through statutes, decrees, regulations, executive orders, administrative decisions, financial provisions, or measures adopted by specialized agencies. However, the domestic origin of a decision does not, in itself, determine its international validity.
A domestic rule may be valid within the legal system that produces it and, at the same time, be incompatible with the international obligations of the State adopting it. Domestic legislation cannot be used as an automatic justification for failure to comply with an international obligation. Consequently, when a measure purports to affect persons, companies, property, financial transactions, or activities conducted outside the territory of the enacting State, it is essential to examine its compatibility with international law. [2]
The expression unilateral extortion, or coercive measures as they are commonly known, encompasses a broad range of practices. These include:
- Blocking or freezing public and private assets.
- Restrictions on foreign trade and financial transactions.
- Export or import prohibitions.
- Limitations on access to technology, medicines, food, fuel, or spare parts.
- Secondary sanctions directed against third States, companies, or individuals.
- Restrictions of a migratory, diplomatic, or administrative nature.
- Threats of inclusion on sanctions lists.
- Measures intended to prevent transactions with financial institutions in third countries.
- Obstacles to obtaining insurance, transportation, commercial intermediation, or essential services.
Not all these measures necessarily have the same legal nature. It is necessary to analyze, among other aspects, the body adopting them, their stated purpose, territorial scope, addressees, intensity of effects, the existence or absence of international authorization, and their compatibility with treaty obligations and customary law.
International law distinguishes between a State’s power to regulate conduct within its territory and an attempt to impose its decisions unilaterally beyond that territory. The latter possibility is limited by the principles of territorial sovereignty, sovereign equality, and non-intervention. The extraterritorial application of a measure does not become lawful merely because the adopting State possesses the economic, financial, or technological capacity to make it effective.
A distinction must also be drawn among foreign-policy measures, retorsion, and countermeasures. Retorsion consists of an unfriendly but lawful response to the unlawful conduct of another State. A countermeasure, by contrast, is a response that would, in principle, affect an international obligation, but whose wrongfulness may be precluded when the conditions established by international law governing State responsibility are strictly met. [3]
It follows that a measure cannot be regarded as a countermeasure merely because the imposing State so declares. For such a characterization to be legally defensible, there must be a prior internationally wrongful act attributable to the State against which the measure is directed; the measure must be directed against that State; it must be temporary in nature; it must be proportionate to the injury suffered; and it must cease when the responsible State complies with its obligations or the wrongful conduct comes to an end.
Moreover, countermeasures may not affect certain fundamental obligations. They may not violate the prohibition of the use of force, fundamental human rights obligations, humanitarian obligations prohibiting reprisals, or other peremptory norms of international law. Nor may they be used to impose a permanent change in rights or obligations or indefinitely replace institutional mechanisms for dispute settlement.
Accordingly, designating a measure as a “sanction” does not resolve its legal status. The decisive question is whether the measure falls within a competence recognized by international law, responds to an unfulfilled legal obligation, respects the applicable substantive and procedural limits, and produces effects compatible with the protection of the population, which is ultimately the most affected.
2. Applicable Regulatory Framework
The United Nations General Assembly entrusted the International Law Commission with developing a legal framework on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The principal result was the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the Commission in 2001 and taken note of by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001. [4]
The International Law Commission also developed the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted in 2011. Both instruments are draft articles and do not, in themselves, constitute general multilateral treaties in force. Their provisions nevertheless have considerable doctrinal and practical relevance because they largely reflect customary rules on attribution, breach, circumstances precluding wrongfulness, and the legal consequences of internationally wrongful acts.
Article 1 of the aforementioned draft established the fundamental principle that every internationally wrongful act of a State entails its international responsibility. Under Article 2, an internationally wrongful act exists when an act or omission:
- Is attributable to the State under international law.
- Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State.
Responsibility therefore does not depend on whether the act is unlawful under domestic law. What is decisive is the inconsistency between the State’s conduct and an international obligation binding upon it at the time the act occurs.
The relevant legal framework includes, among other sources:
- The Charter of the United Nations.
- The principle of the sovereign equality of States.
- The prohibition of the threat or use of force.
- The principle of non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States.
- The obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means.
- International human rights norms.
- International humanitarian law.
- Rules governing sovereign immunity.
- International economic and trade law.
- Customary international law.
- Obligations arising from bilateral and multilateral treaties.
- Peremptory norms of general international law.
The Charter of the United Nations establishes an institutional system for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council may take collective coercive measures under Chapter VII when it determines the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. This institutional competence is not equivalent to a general authorization for each State to adopt unilateral coercive measures with international effects.
The absence of Security Council authorization does not automatically render every unilateral measure unlawful, since international law permits certain responses by States in specific circumstances (in this regard, resolution 56/83 on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts). Such responses are not equivalent to a collective decision of the international community. The distinction among institutional action, legal response, and unilateral coercion is essential to preserving the structure of the Charter.
The non-binding nature of Resolution 56/83 does not diminish the relevance of the principles it contains. The analysis must proceed provision by provision because not all rules in the draft articles necessarily possess the same legal nature or normative force. In particular, rules concerning the prohibition of certain conduct, protection of fundamental rights, and observance of peremptory obligations may carry greater weight than merely dispositive rules. [5]
3. Extraterritoriality and the Prohibition of Intervention
One of the most problematic aspects of unilateral coercive measures is their extraterritorial dimension. A State may adopt decisions intended to regulate activities occurring within its territory or possessing a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with it. The situation changes, however, when it seeks to compel third States, foreign companies, or persons outside its territorial jurisdiction to comply with restrictions imposed unilaterally.
Extraterritoriality may manifest itself in different ways. It may take the form of directly applying a rule to events occurring outside the territory, threatening sanctions against foreign companies that trade with a third State, using dominant financial systems to prevent international transactions, or imposing restrictions on persons lacking a sufficient legal relationship with the sanctioning State.
Such practices must be examined in light of the principles of territorial jurisdiction, nationality, protective jurisdiction, and universality, as applicable. It is insufficient merely to show that a financial transaction passes through an institution located in the territory of the State applying the measure. It must be established whether that connection justifies, under international law, extending the prohibition to a transaction conducted essentially between third States.
Intervention may also occur through economic pressure. The prohibition of intervention is not limited to the use of military force. It includes coercive interference in matters that each State is entitled to determine freely in the exercise of its sovereignty. When an economic measure seeks to impose changes in another State’s political, economic, or social structure through the deliberate deprivation of indispensable resources, serious questions may arise regarding its compatibility with the principle of non-intervention.
The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, contained in General Assembly Resolution 2625, affirms that no State may use economic, political, or other measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or advantages of any kind. [6]
The legal analysis must therefore consider not only the measure’s form but also its purpose, enforcement mechanism, and foreseeable consequences. A measure may be presented as neutral financial regulation yet operate materially as an instrument of pressure intended to condition another State’s sovereign decisions.
4. Procedural Requirements and Means of Settlement
The existence of a dispute between States requires, first, recourse to the mechanisms of peaceful settlement provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 33 establishes that the parties shall seek a solution through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. [7]
This duty does not mean that States are required to accept a particular solution or that every dispute must necessarily be resolved by an international court. It means that unilateral coercion cannot automatically replace dialogue, negotiation, fact-finding, and the available institutional mechanisms.
A procedure compatible with international law should include, at a minimum, the following elements:
- Precise identification of the international obligation allegedly breached.
- A statement of the facts on which the claim is based.
- Formal communication to the allegedly responsible State.
- Submission of a request for cessation or reparation.
- Exploration of negotiated solutions.
- Assessment of mediation or conciliation mechanisms.
- Consideration of arbitration or judicial proceedings.
- Determination of the proportionality and temporariness of any response.
- Effective protection of the population and fundamental rights.
- Periodic review of the necessity and scope of the measure.
The absence of satisfactory negotiations does not, by itself, authorize the adoption of any measure. Nor does the failure of diplomacy permit disregard of the rules limiting countermeasures. The legality of a response must be examined in light of its substantive and procedural conditions.
A measure adopted outside these parameters may constitute an internationally wrongful act. Wrongfulness may arise from the absence of a prior act attributable to the target State, lack of proportionality, the permanent nature of the measure, infringement of fundamental rights, violation of obligations owed to third States, or breach of peremptory norms.
The peaceful settlement of disputes should not be understood as an empty formality. It is a safeguard against replacing law with the imposition of economic, financial, or technological power. The requirement of transparent procedures also makes it possible to determine who made the decision, its legal basis, the purpose pursued, and what assessment was made of its humanitarian consequences.
5. Legal Consequences: International Responsibility of the State
The commission of an internationally wrongful act entails international responsibility. Such responsibility has consequences distinct from domestic civil liability and must not be confused with individual criminal responsibility.
The international responsibility of the State may entail:
- Investigation of the facts.
- Cessation of the wrongful act.
- Guarantees of non-repetition.
- Restitution, where materially possible.
- Compensation for financially assessable damage.
- Satisfaction for the moral or legal injury caused.
- Acknowledgment of the breach.
- Repeal or amendment of measures incompatible with international law.
- Full reparation for victims.
Restitution seeks to re-establish, insofar as possible, the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed. Where restitution is impossible or insufficient, compensation is appropriate. This may include material damage, economic losses, deterioration of infrastructure, damage to public services, loss of revenue, and other demonstrable harm.
Reparation may also encompass harm arising from impacts on economic, social, and cultural rights. When a measure impedes access to medicines, food, fuel, medical equipment, spare parts, or essential technologies, the assessment of harm should not be limited to commercial losses. It must consider consequences for life, health, education, food, housing, development, and human dignity.
The attribution of responsibility requires determining which organs, entities, or agents acted on behalf of the State. Decisions by ministries, central banks, financial supervisory bodies, administrative agencies, diplomatic services, and other public institutions may be attributed to the State under international law. The conduct of entities empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority may also be attributable, even where they formally operate with administrative autonomy.
A State cannot be exempted by alleging that the measure was taken by an independent body if, under international law, the conduct is attributable to it. Similarly, the internal division of competences cannot be used to evade international responsibility.
6. Peremptory Norms and Obligations Owed to the International Community
Jus cogens, or peremptory law, consists of norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which may be modified only by a subsequent norm of the same character.
Norms generally associated with this category include the prohibitions of genocide, slavery, torture, aggression, and certain international crimes. Identifying a norm as peremptory requires rigorous legal analysis and cannot be asserted solely on the basis of a political declaration.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. Likewise, a treaty becomes void and terminates if a new peremptory norm emerges with which it conflicts. Although unilateral coercive measures, by their nature, are unilateral acts and therefore do not fall within the category of treaties, these rules serve by analogy in evaluating the unlawfulness and invalidity of any act producing extraterritorial effects against another State.
The existence of peremptory norms also has consequences for unilateral coercive measures. First, it prevents States from invoking domestic or international agreements to justify breaches of fundamental obligations. Second, it limits the possibility of taking countermeasures that affect those obligations. Third, it activates duties of cooperation to bring situations created by serious breaches to an end.
A distinction must nevertheless be drawn between a violation of human rights and a violation of a specific norm of jus cogens. Any violation of a peremptory norm constitutes a particularly serious breach, but not every human rights violation can automatically be classified as a violation of an erga omnes norm. This clarification does not diminish the gravity of the harm caused; rather, it prevents the category from being used without an adequate legal basis.
Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and international jurisprudence provide relevant elements for analyzing these obligations. [8] The International Court of Justice has recognized the existence of obligations enforceable vis-à-vis all States in certain fields, although identifying an obligation as erga omnes does not automatically establish that it has the character of jus cogens.
This distinction is central. An erga omnes obligation is one whose performance is of legal interest to the international community as a whole. A peremptory norm, moreover, permits no derogation by contrary agreement. The two categories may overlap in some cases, but they are not identical.
7. Aggravated Wrongfulness and the Criminal-Law Dimension
When a unilateral coercive measure violates an international obligation and also produces grave consequences for fundamental rights or the survival of a population, it may be described as an international wrong of particular gravity. Gravity must be determined according to the nature of the obligation breached, the intensity, duration, and scope of the conduct, the foreseeability of its effects, and the circumstances of the persons affected.
The aggravated responsibility of a State does not automatically amount to individual criminal responsibility. International law distinguishes among:
- The international responsibility of the State.
- The administrative or civil liability of legal persons.
- Individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.
- The disciplinary or political responsibility of officials.
An unlawful economic measure does not in itself constitute a crime against humanity. For conduct to fall within Article 7 of the Rome Statute, all elements of the crime must be fulfilled. In particular, the acts must form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy, and the perpetrator must act with the knowledge required by the Statute. [9]
Article 7 encompasses, among other acts, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts. Extermination may include the intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. The legal framework nevertheless requires proof of intent and the other contextual elements. This is plainly a procedural matter involving proof through the necessary evidentiary material to establish the objective elements of the offence, the nexus of culpability, and the other elements identifying the person responsible for criminal purposes.
For that reason, the assertion that certain coercive measures constitute crimes against humanity must be based on concrete evidence and a determination that the criminal elements are met. The decision to impose the measure, knowledge of its effects, the availability of reasonable alternatives, the anticipated harm to the civilian population, refusal to establish effective humanitarian exceptions, and the causal relationship between the measure and the consequences produced must all be analyzed.
Reports of the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights have expressed concern about the effects of such measures on economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as their humanitarian consequences. [10] These reports are relevant for documenting impacts, identifying patterns, and formulating recommendations, although their existence does not replace a judicial determination of criminal responsibility.
Individual criminal responsibility may extend to persons who order, design, implement, or facilitate an unlawful policy where their conduct satisfies the elements of an international crime. Official capacity does not exclude individual responsibility. Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that official status neither exempts a person from criminal responsibility nor constitutes, in itself, a ground for reduction of sentence. [11]
8. The Impact on Human Rights
Unilateral coercive measures must also be examined from a human rights perspective. Their impact may arise directly, when a measure expressly prohibits an indispensable activity, or indirectly, when it creates a set of obstacles that prevents effective access to essential goods and services.
Rights potentially affected include:
- The right to life.
- The right to health.
- The right to food.
- The right to water.
- The right to education.
- The right to work.
- The right to social security.
- The right to development.
- The right to science and its benefits.
- The right to culture.
- The right to housing.
- The right to an adequate standard of living.
The assessment must incorporate the principle of non-discrimination. General measures may have differentiated effects on children, older persons, persons with disabilities, chronically ill patients, pregnant women, rural communities, and vulnerable sectors. The existence of formal exceptions for food or medicines does not in itself guarantee that such goods can be effectively purchased, transported, insured, financed, and distributed.
So-called overcompliance by banks, transportation companies, insurers, technology providers, and humanitarian organizations must also be assessed. Legal uncertainty and fear of secondary sanctions may lead these actors to cancel legitimate operations even when they are formally authorized by humanitarian licences or exceptions.
In such cases, the measure produces effects broader than those contemplated in its formal text. The legality analysis must consider the actual operation of the regime, not only the exceptions contained in the regulations. An exception that cannot be used because of financial, administrative, or logistical obstacles may be insufficient to protect the rights affected.
The obligation to respect human rights does not disappear when State conduct occurs outside national territory. The scope of extraterritorial obligations will depend on the applicable legal source, the degree of control or influence exercised, and the relationship between the State’s conduct and the harm caused. In any event, the State cannot entirely disregard the foreseeable consequences of its decisions for populations subject to its economic or financial power.
9. The Case of Venezuela and the Effects of Coercive Measures
Venezuela has been one of the countries most affected by regimes of unilateral coercive measures. These measures have affected its financial operations, exports, imports, access to credit, acquisition of essential goods, infrastructure maintenance, transportation, energy production, and institutional response capacity.
The effects of the measures should not be examined in isolation from other factors that may also influence a country’s economic and social situation. A legally sound assessment must distinguish among consequences directly attributable to a specific measure, the cumulative effects of different restrictive regimes, difficulties in domestic governance, and external economic or geopolitical factors.
Research conducted by Elsie Rosales and Yosmer Arellán Zurita has documented, through empirical data, the harmful effects of sanctions on the Venezuelan population. [12] In 2021, during an international event involving internationally renowned jurists, findings were presented concerning economic contraction, the unavailability of medicines, inadequate access to food, the provision of basic services, and other dimensions of daily life.
The use of empirical data is therefore indispensable to establishing international responsibility; it is not enough to assert that a measure is politically unjust. The conjunction of factors must demonstrate:
- The existence and content of the measure.
- The agency or State that adopted it.
- The conduct of the entities that implemented it.
- The jurisdictional or extraterritorial nexus.
- The assets, sectors, or persons affected.
- The foreseeability of the consequences.
- The causal relationship between the measure and the harm.
- The existence of less harmful alternatives.
- The duration and cumulative effect of the restrictions.
- The absence or insufficiency of humanitarian mechanisms.
As part of its legal and political response, Venezuela submitted communications and documents to international bodies, including the International Criminal Court. The situation concerning Venezuela was the subject of proceedings by the Office of the Prosecutor within the jurisdictional framework established by the Rome Statute. However, the matter did not progress beyond the preliminary examination stage.
It is nevertheless maintained that the International Criminal Court may exercise jurisdiction in the circumstances provided for by the Rome Statute. These include crimes committed in the territory of a State Party (so-called effects-based jurisdiction), crimes committed by nationals of a State Party, and certain situations referred by the Security Council. The fact that the allegedly responsible State is outside the Rome system does not automatically exclude jurisdiction, but neither does it establish jurisdiction by itself. [13]
The question of unilateral coercive measures before international criminal jurisdiction clearly requires proof that the acts constitute one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. Political debate concerning the unlawfulness or injustice of sanctions must be translated into a specific criminal-law argument based on the objective and subjective elements of each crime.
10. Responsibility of the State Adopting Unilateral Coercive Measures
A State that designs, approves, imposes, and maintains a coercive measure may incur international responsibility if its conduct violates an obligation binding upon it. Responsibility may arise both from the initial act and from the continuation of its effects, particularly when the State is aware of the measure’s humanitarian impact and refuses to amend or suspend it.
Responsibility may arise from:
- Adoption of a measure without a sufficient basis in international law.
- Extraterritorial application of domestic legislation.
- Violation of obligations of non-intervention.
- Failure to comply with human rights obligations.
- Violation of sovereign immunities.
- Infringement of the rights of third States.
- Imposition of secondary sanctions.
- Obstruction of humanitarian operations.
- Refusal to establish effective exceptions.
- Continuation of the measure after its basis has ceased to exist.
The assessment must consider both the stated and the actual purpose. A measure may be presented as an instrument for promoting human rights and yet cause widespread harm to the civilian population. Protective rhetoric does not relieve the State of demonstrating that the measure is necessary, proportionate, legally grounded, and compatible with its other international obligations.
11. Responsibility of Officials, Companies, and Cooperating States
Responsibility is not necessarily limited to the State formally issuing the measures. The conduct of officials, agencies, companies, and third States involved in or facilitating their implementation must also be examined.
At the State level, a third State may incur responsibility if it aids or assists in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, provided that it acts with knowledge of the circumstances of the act and that the conduct would also have been wrongful had it committed the act itself. This rule requires a specific analysis of the degree of involvement, the information available, and the nature of the assistance provided.
Not every commercial or administrative relationship with a sanctions regime automatically entails international responsibility. A legally relevant contribution must be demonstrated. The mere existence of economic ties may be insufficient; coordinated asset freezes, the deliberate interruption of essential supplies, or the knowing enforcement of a manifestly unlawful measure may present a different case. A causal relationship between these factors and the harmful result of the measure or measures is indispensable.
The United States, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control and other financial agencies, and the European Union, through their respective regulatory instruments, have applied regimes of restrictive measures producing international effects. The legality of these actions must be assessed separately for each regime, agency, measure, and target. It is inappropriate to attribute identical legal consequences to different provisions without examining their content and scope. Nevertheless, these entities have caused the greatest harmful effects on the population.
The European Union and its Member States, for example, may adopt restrictive measures within their domestic legal competences. Such measures are nevertheless also subject to international obligations, including protection of fundamental rights, legality, proportionality, respect for due process, and compatibility with general international law.
Private companies occupy a complex position. In principle, their conduct is not automatically attributable to a State. Attribution may nevertheless arise when they act under State instructions, direction, or control; exercise elements of governmental authority; or are functionally integrated into the implementation of State policy. In the criminal sphere, responsibility will depend on individual conduct and the elements of the relevant offence.
The responsibility of officials who design or implement the measures must also be considered. Individual responsibility may arise from ordering, authorizing, facilitating, or intentionally carrying out conduct constituting international crimes. Functional immunity or hierarchical position cannot be used as a general explanation for excluding responsibility when the requirements of international criminal law are met. [14]
12. Causation and Proof of Harm
One of the greatest challenges in any international proceeding is proving the causal link between the measure and the alleged harm. The existence of a coercive measure and the simultaneous existence of an economic crisis are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish legal causation.
The evidence must be developed using a methodology capable of identifying:
- The situation existing before adoption of the measure.
- The time at which the measure began to produce effects.
- The intensity and duration of the restrictions.
- The activities or assets directly affected.
- Decisions by banks, companies, and suppliers.
- The cumulative effects of successive measures.
- The existence of independent economic factors.
- The actual availability of humanitarian exceptions.
- The foreseeability of the harm.
- The subsequent conduct of the sanctioning State.
Causation may be direct or concurrent. Harm may result from a combination of several causes without necessarily eliminating a State’s responsibility. In such cases, the analysis must determine each factor’s contribution, the foreseeability of the consequences, and the degree of control each actor exercised over the outcome.
Evidence may include official documents, foreign-trade data, banking records, cancelled contracts, medical reports, mortality statistics, testimony, diplomatic communications, administrative decisions, economic analyses, and sectoral studies. Evidence concerning the effects of secondary sanctions and private overcompliance may also be used.
A sound argument must avoid two extremes. The first is attributing all economic problems to external measures without examining other factors. The second is denying any causal relationship because internal or structural factors exist. The law of responsibility requires a concrete, evidence-based, and differentiated analysis.
13. Full Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Repetition
Reparation should not be reduced to financial compensation. In cases involving unilateral coercive measures, full reparation may include:
- Removal or amendment of the unlawful measure.
- Elimination of secondary sanctions incompatible with international law.
- Restitution of property, where applicable.
- Compensation for material and moral damage.
- Reconstruction of affected infrastructure.
- Restoration of essential services.
- Ensuring access to medicines and food.
- Review of humanitarian licences and exceptions.
- Investigation of the harm caused.
- Public acknowledgment of the breach.
- Adoption of measures to prevent recurrence.
Cessation is especially important while the measure continues to produce effects. Future reparation would be meaningless if the State simultaneously maintained the wrongful conduct. The first duty is therefore to end the breach when it is continuing in character.
Guarantees of non-repetition may require legislative, administrative, or institutional changes. They may also include supervisory mechanisms, prior humanitarian-impact assessments, judicial review, transparent decision-making, consultation with international agencies, and procedures for resolving complaints by affected third States and individuals.
At this point, reparation is linked to the effectiveness of international law. It is not enough to recognize an obligation in the abstract; mechanisms must be established to identify the violation, attribute responsibility, order cessation, and obtain reparation. The absence of effective mechanisms favors the discretion of States possessing greater economic and financial capacity.
14. The Enforcement Deficit in International Law
The contemporary regime of international responsibility faces a structural difficulty: the existence of rules is not always accompanied by compulsory and accessible mechanisms for their enforcement.
International responsibility often depends on State consent to jurisdiction, the availability of claims mechanisms, and the political will of States. This situation may create a gap between the proclamation of rights and their effective protection.
The deficit is especially notable in three areas:
- The difficulty of bringing States applying coercive measures before courts or tribunals.
- The absence of automatic reparation mechanisms.
- The lack of universal procedures for assessing the humanitarian impact of measures.
This limitation has a direct impact on the right to peace, the right to development, and the international protection of human rights. The legal order may recognize fundamental principles while leaving their application subject to the will of the most powerful States.
The question is not only whether a measure is legally unlawful. It is also necessary to ask who may declare that unlawfulness, which body may order cessation, how harm is proved, who guarantees reparation, and what consequences the responsible State faces when it fails to comply.
Consolidating an international order based on human dignity requires progress toward more effective forms of oversight. These include:
- Jurisdictional mechanisms with sufficient competence.
- Interstate and individual complaint procedures.
- Mandatory humanitarian-impact assessments.
- Periodic review of measures.
- Enhanced protection of essential goods.
- Effective prohibition of secondary sanctions.
- International reparation systems.
- Greater transparency in decision-making.
- Participation by affected States and civil society.
- Coordination among bodies concerned with human rights, trade, and peace and security.
Conclusion
Unilateral coercive measures cannot be excluded from scrutiny under international law merely because they were adopted through domestic statutes, decrees, or administrative decisions. When they produce extraterritorial effects, interfere with another State’s exercise of sovereignty, affect fundamental rights, or are maintained without a sufficient basis in international law, they may give rise to internationally wrongful acts.
Determining responsibility requires a specific analysis of each measure. Its legal basis, purpose, territorial scope, responsible authority, compatibility with the Charter of the United Nations, relationship to a possible countermeasure, proportionality, temporariness, humanitarian impact, and consequences for third States and individuals must be examined.
The international responsibility of the State may give rise to duties of cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. Separately, individual criminal responsibility may arise when conduct satisfies the elements of an international crime, without the perpetrator’s official status constituting an automatic defense.
In the case of Venezuela, the analysis must be supported by empirical evidence documenting the effects of the measures on the economy, health, food, education, science, culture, public services, and development. It must also distinguish between consequences attributable to external measures and those arising from other factors. A sound legal case need not simplify reality; it must demonstrate it with precision.
The international community cannot remain indifferent to the use of economic coercion as a substitute for legal and diplomatic procedures. Nor can it accept the invocation of human rights as justification for measures that, in their concrete implementation, cause widespread suffering among the population.
The principle of sovereign equality requires that no State transform its financial, technological, or commercial power into a general power to dictate rules to the rest of the international community. International cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, responsibility, and reparation must prevail over threats, blockades, and arbitrary coercion.
The international judicial avenue, although complex and limited by jurisdictional rules, remains a necessary tool. It must, however, be complemented by political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and multilateral mechanisms capable of preventing harm and ensuring timely responses.
The debate on unilateral coercive measures is not merely a debate about economic sanctions. It concerns the limits of State power, the effectiveness of international law, the protection of peoples, and the possibility of building an international order in which sovereignty is not a privilege of the strongest but a guarantee of equality among States.
From this forum, we reaffirm our commitment to the rigorous study of these practices, the defense of victims, and the construction of an international order founded on law, cooperation, peace, development, and human dignity—not on unilateral coercion or arbitrary imposition.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Notes
[1]: The expression “measures of extortion” has been used by various States, social organizations, and academic sectors to emphasize the abusive, disproportionate, or coercive nature of certain unilateral measures. In the institutional language of the United Nations, the expression “unilateral coercive measures” predominates. The use of either term should be explained so that terminological differences do not obscure the underlying legal problem.
[2]: Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Although the rule refers directly to treaty obligations, it expresses a general principle: domestic law cannot prevail over the international obligations of the State.
[3]: Retorsion is an unfriendly but, in principle, lawful measure. Countermeasures are responses to a prior internationally wrongful act and may be invoked only when they satisfy strict conditions, including proportionality, temporariness, and the purpose of inducing the responsible State to comply with its obligations. See Articles 22 and 49–54 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, 2001.
[4]: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, which takes note of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and commends them to the attention of Governments.
[5]: Jus cogens is defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as one from which no derogation is permitted and which may be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
[6]: General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 24 October 1970 contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Its formulation concerning economic coercion must be read together with State practice, doctrine, and other applicable sources of international law.
[7]: Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations mentions, among other means, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or arrangements.
[8]: The International Court of Justice has examined the existence of obligations owed to the international community in cases such as Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment of 5 February 1970. Reference to peremptory or imperative norms requires a different and more stringent analysis than the identification of erga omnes obligations.
[9]: Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity. Their commission requires, among other elements, that the acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and that the perpetrator act with knowledge of that attack. The political or economic gravity of a measure is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute this crime.
[10]: The Office of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights has prepared reports on their effects on economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as their humanitarian consequences. Resolutions and reports of special procedures are relevant sources of documentation and assessment, although they do not replace a jurisdictional determination of responsibility.
[11]: Article 27 of the Rome Statute establishes the irrelevance of official capacity before the International Criminal Court. Individual criminal responsibility requires, in every case, proof of the objective and subjective elements of the alleged crime.
[12]: Studies by Elsie Rosales and Arellán Zurita have addressed the effects of coercive measures on Venezuela’s economic and social indicators, including gross domestic product, access to medicines, food availability, and the provision of basic services. A final academic version should include complete bibliographic references, methodology, the period analyzed, and the criteria used to attribute causation.
[13]: Article 12 of the Rome Statute establishes the preconditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be based, among other grounds, on territoriality, the nationality of the accused, or a Security Council referral. The procedural status of a communication, examination, or investigation must be described precisely and consistently with the officially recognized stage.
[14]: Attribution of conduct to a State and individual criminal responsibility are distinct matters. The former is governed by the rules of international responsibility of States; the latter requires proof of individual participation, knowledge, and the other elements of the crime prescribed by international criminal law.
Traducción y revisión: microsoft/copilot/word.
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