Derecho Internacional Público

La relevancia del Derecho Internacional Público consiste en su interconexión con los sistemas jurídicos de todos los estados. Facilita la comprensión de las instituciones que rigen el comportamiento de éstos, a objeto de cumplir con los fines y metas de la civilidad y la juridicidad universal.

domingo, 4 de octubre de 2026

Los actos unilaterales de los Estados como fuente de obligaciones y derechos en el Derecho internacional

 




Dos cosas contribuyen a avanzar: ir más deprisa que los otros, o ir por el buen camino (René Descartes)


Prof. Dr. Carmelo Borrego

Nota: Este artículo ha sido revisado y republicado debido a su amplia difusión.




Introducción


Los actos unilaterales de los Estados ocupan un lugar singular dentro del Derecho internacional. A diferencia de los tratados —que surgen del consentimiento concordante—, el acto unilateral puede producir consecuencias jurídicas a partir de la manifestación de voluntad de un solo Estado. Su eficacia no depende necesariamente de una aceptación formal por parte de otro sujeto internacional, aunque puede generar derechos, expectativas jurídicas u obligaciones correlativas para terceros.

La dificultad central radica en determinar cuándo una declaración estatal constituye un acto jurídico internacional y cuándo se trata únicamente de una manifestación política, diplomática o informativa. La práctica muestra que la publicidad no basta: deben analizarse el contenido, el contexto, la autoridad del declarante, la intención objetiva de obligarse y la conducta posterior del Estado.

La jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia —en particular en los asuntos relativos a Ensayos nucleares— reconoce que ciertas declaraciones unilaterales pueden producir efectos jurídicos vinculantes. Sin embargo, el reconocimiento exige una lectura restrictiva para evitar que toda comunicación pública se convierta automáticamente en obligación internacional y termine limitando indebidamente la libertad de acción de los Estados.

Tesis: Un acto unilateral estatal produce obligaciones internacionales cuando una manifestación clara, precisa, pública y atribuible a una autoridad competente revela la intención objetiva de quedar jurídicamente obligado, formulada de buena fe y sin vicios relevantes que afecten la libertad o validez de la voluntad estatal.

I. El concepto y la naturaleza jurídica

El acto unilateral puede definirse como manifestación de voluntad imputable a un Estado, emitida por una autoridad competente y destinada a producir consecuencias jurídicas en el plano internacional, sin que sea indispensable la aceptación formal de otro Estado. Se trata de un acto autónomo, no necesariamente vinculado a un acuerdo convencional previo.

Esta definición requiere distinguir:

• La manifestación unilateral: la voluntad procede de un solo Estado.

• La imputabilidad: la declaración debe atribuirse al Estado.

• La intención jurídica: debe existir una intención objetiva de producir consecuencias jurídicas mediante la exteriorización de la voluntad.

La unilateralidad se predica del origen de la manifestación, no de la inexistencia de efectos respecto de otros sujetos. El Estado puede quedar obligado por su propia declaración, mientras que terceros Estados pueden adquirir derechos, formular exigencias o invocar la confianza generada.

No debe confundirse con una oferta negocial ordinaria. En el Derecho internacional, la obligación no depende necesariamente de la formación de un “contrato” internacional; en los actos unilaterales autónomos el fundamento es la propia declaración y el principio de buena fe, sin perjuicio de que se utilicen categorías convergentes como la confianza legítima y el estoppel (este último opera como consecuencia jurídica vinculada a coherencia conductual, no como acto unilateral en sentido estricto).

II. Los elementos constitutivos del acto unilateral

Para cualificar una declaración como acto unilateral jurídicamente relevante, deben concurrir elementos analíticos:

1. La manifestación de voluntad jurídicamente apreciable

Debe existir una conducta externa —verbal, escrita o, en ciertos supuestos, material— que revele la posición del Estado. Puede constar en discursos oficiales, comunicados, notas diplomáticas, declaraciones ante organizaciones internacionales, intervenciones ante tribunales, documentos oficiales o conductas administrativas inequívocas.

No toda afirmación cuenta: opiniones personales, expresiones hipotéticas, promesas electorales o enunciados meramente programáticos no generan per se obligaciones internacionales.

2. La autoridad del declarante y la imputabilidad estatal

La declaración debe ser atribuible al Estado. En principio, jefes de Estado, jefes de Gobierno y ministros de Relaciones Exteriores pueden comprometer al Estado en razón de sus funciones, sin acreditar poderes especiales para cada manifestación.

Puede atribuirse también cuando:

• existen poderes expresos,

• la actuación se realiza dentro de las competencias funcionales,

• la práctica estatal permite reconocer esa representación o mandato,

• el Estado confirma posteriormente la declaración (ad referendum), o

• las circunstancias demuestran aceptación de la actuación (incluida la apariencia objetiva de representación).

La capacidad de representación no se presume: debe apoyarse en competencias, la práctica estatal, la confirmación posterior o una apariencia objetiva verificable.

3. La claridad y la precisión del compromiso

La declaración debe permitir identificar razonablemente:

• la conducta prometida u omitida,

• el destinatario o grupo,

• el alcance material,

• el ámbito temporal,

• y las condiciones aplicables cuando existan.

La ambigüedad, la indeterminación de las condiciones o el carácter puramente programático de una formulación impiden identificar con suficiente precisión el compromiso jurídico. La interpretación debe atender al texto y a su contexto.

4. La intención objetiva de producir efectos jurídicos

El elemento decisivo no es la solemnidad sino la intención objetiva. Se infiere del lenguaje, de la autoridad del declarante, de la publicidad, del contexto diplomático, de la naturaleza del asunto, de la reacción de otros Estados y de la conducta posterior.

No se trata de la voluntad psicológica interna del funcionario, sino de lo que objetivamente podía entenderse como compromiso jurídico.

5. La buena fe

La buena fe cumple una doble función: orienta la interpretación y evita que el Estado desconozca arbitrariamente un compromiso que presentó como jurídicamente vinculante. No convierte per se cualquier declaración política en obligación internacional: opera cuando concurren los demás elementos.

6. La ausencia de vicios relevantes

La declaración debe formularse con libertad y competencia, sin vicios relevantes. Aunque las normas de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados no se aplican automáticamente a los actos unilaterales (por no ser tratados), algunas categorías pueden usarse como criterios hermenéuticos auxiliares, siempre compatibles con la naturaleza específica del acto unilateral.

III. Los Ensayos nucleares: el precedente central y sus límites

En Australia c. Francia y Nueva Zelanda c. Francia, la Corte reconoció la fuerza jurídica de determinadas declaraciones públicas vinculadas al cese de los ensayos nucleares atmosféricos (CIJ, Ensayos nucleares, fallos de 20 de diciembre de 1974, Recueil 1974, pp. 253 y 457). En particular, valoró:

• la autoridad de quienes declararon,

• el carácter público,

• el contenido del compromiso,

• el contexto político y jurídico,

• la posibilidad de generar confianza en la comunidad internacional,

• la ausencia de reservas que permitieran una reconsideración arbitraria.

La CIJ señaló en su momento: En el presente caso, el demandante, aun reconociendo la posibilidad de que la controversia sea resuelta mediante una declaración unilateral de Francia, ha manifestado que, a su juicio, ha quedado abierta la posibilidad de nuevos ensayos atmosféricos, incluso después de las declaraciones francesas anteriormente mencionadas. La Corte debe formarse, sin embargo, su propia opinión del significado y el alcance que se pretende dar a esas declaraciones unilaterales. Teniendo en cuenta su intención y las circunstancias en que fueron hechas, debe entenderse que constituyen un compromiso del Estado francés (…). Es cierto que Francia no reconoció que estuviera obligada por ninguna norma de Derecho internacional a concluir sus ensayos, pero eso no afecta a las consecuencias jurídicas de las declaraciones hechas; no puede interpretarse que el compromiso unilateral resultante se haya adquirido con la salvedad implícita de una facultad arbitraria de reconsideración.

En este sentido, la Corte concluyó que las declaraciones constituían un compromiso del Estado francés; en consecuencia, el litigio quedó sin objeto para el examen de fondo.

Principio extraíble sobre la declaración judicial: cuando un Estado formula públicamente una declaración clara de intención de obligarse, la buena fe exige reconocer sus efectos jurídicos aunque no exista tratado ni aceptación formal del destinatario.

El límite metodológico: la decisión no autoriza la regla de “toda declaración pública obliga”. La obligación surge solo cuando el lenguaje, el contexto y la autoridad revelan la intención objetiva de asumir el compromiso; además, una vez generado un débito, la revocación arbitraria se rechaza en principio (aunque la revocabilidad depende de la naturaleza del acto y las circunstancias).

IV. Los límites derivados de los Ensayos nucleares

El caso no permite concluir que toda declaración dirigida a la comunidad internacional cree obligaciones. La declaración debe ser, en esencia:

• clara e inequívoca,

• específica,

• atribuible a una autoridad competente,

• formulada en un contexto que revele una intención jurídica,

• compatible con la conducta posterior,

• y libre de condiciones que impidan identificar el compromiso.

Regla transversal de análisis: no basta con que el mensaje tenga una dirección externa; son su contenido y su contexto los que permiten calificarlo como una obligación jurídicamente exigible.

V. La promesa unilateral, la oferta política y el compromiso jurídico

La oferta pública puede abarcar niveles distintos de compromiso. El punto no es si el Estado habló en público, sino qué exactamente prometió y bajo qué condiciones.

En el ejemplo de la oferta española de vacunas contra la COVID-19, puede distinguirse analíticamente:

• el anuncio general de solidaridad (declaración política),

• la oferta condicionada a disponibilidad presupuestaria (obligación condicionada),

• la oferta con destinatarios identificados y condiciones precisas (posible promesa jurídica),

• y finalmente la ejecución/entrega (confirmación del compromiso o cumplimiento).

La metodología mínima de clasificación exige identificar quién formuló la declaración, cuál era su autoridad, si el objeto y la cantidad estaban determinados, si existían condiciones presupuestarias o administrativas, si el adeudo dependía de una negociación futura y si el Estado confirmó posteriormente su posición.

Conclusión: una declaración pública puede ser susceptible de producir efectos jurídicos, pero no hay obligación unilateral automática; la calificación depende del contenido, de la autoridad, de las condiciones y de la intención objetiva.

VI. Los actos unilaterales de naturaleza jurisdiccional (CIJ)

Las declaraciones mediante las cuales los Estados aceptan la jurisdicción obligatoria de la Corte tienen naturaleza unilateral, pero su función es principalmente procesal: sirven de fundamento a la competencia de la CIJ dentro de los límites consentidos por los Estados.

El artículo 36.2 del Estatuto permite formular declaraciones de reconocimiento de la jurisdicción obligatoria respecto de otros Estados que acepten la misma obligación, conforme al principio de reciprocidad. Estas declaraciones pueden incluir reservas y límites temporales o materiales; por ello, deben interpretarse según su texto y contexto. Aunque son unilaterales, su eficacia procesal depende de la materia, las reservas, la reciprocidad, la vigencia y la relación entre las partes.

Ejemplos:

Pesquerías (España c. Canadá), fallo sobre competencia de 4 de diciembre de 1998 (CIJ, Recueil 1998, p. 432): la Corte interpretó la reserva canadiense conforme a su texto, contexto y propósito, y concluyó que la controversia quedaba comprendida en ella; por tanto, se declaró incompetente para conocer del fondo.

Actividades armadas en el territorio del Congo (República Democrática del Congo c. Uganda), fallo de 19 de diciembre de 2005 (CIJ, Recueil 2005, p. 168): la competencia se fundó en las declaraciones de aceptación de la jurisdicción obligatoria formuladas por ambos Estados conforme al artículo 36.2 del Estatuto. El caso confirma el efecto procesal de estos actos unilaterales dentro del ámbito coincidente de los consentimientos estatales.

VII. Los actos unilaterales autónomos y los actos unilaterales vinculados con tratados

Deben distinguirse las siguientes categorías:

1. Los actos unilaterales autónomos

Su eficacia se analiza principalmente a partir de la declaración estatal. Pueden incluir promesas, renuncias, reconocimientos y garantías, así como declaraciones de intención jurídicamente vinculante.

2. Los actos unilaterales vinculados con tratados

Aunque formalmente sean unilaterales (p. ej., la firma, la ratificación, la adhesión, la aprobación, la denuncia, la notificación del retiro, la formulación o el retiro de reservas), sus efectos se rigen por el Derecho de los tratados. No son equivalentes a actos unilaterales autónomos, porque la fuente inmediata de sus efectos es el régimen convencional, aunque esos efectos puedan producirse en momentos distintos.

La distinción puede resumirse así:

• La promesa unilateral → declaración autónoma del Estado.

• La ratificación, la adhesión o la denuncia → el tratado y las normas del régimen de Derecho de los tratados.

• La aceptación de la jurisdicción → Estatuto de la CIJ y declaración estatal.

• La protesta → preservación de derechos u oposición.

• El reconocimiento → aceptación de una situación jurídica.

VIII. La protesta, la notificación, el reconocimiento, la aquiescencia y el silencio

Estos fenómenos pueden tener relevancia jurídica, pero no deben confundirse entre sí ni con la promesa unilateral.

La protesta

Se trata principalmente de una reacción estatal ante una conducta considerada contraria a un derecho o interés. Se justifica para preservar esos derechos afectados o puestos en peligro y evitar que el silencio sea interpretado como aceptación. Normalmente no crea una obligación sustantiva a cargo del Estado que protesta; su papel principal es impedir la aquiescencia.

La notificación

La notificación comunica oficialmente una decisión o situación y, por regla general, se formula por escrito y se transmite por vía diplomática. Sus efectos dependen del régimen convencional o jurídico aplicable, como ocurre en materia de jurisdicción, el Derecho del mar, los tratados, la responsabilidad internacional, las medidas de protección o emergencias.

El reconocimiento

Puede consolidar una posición jurídica o impedir sostener una postura incompatible. Exige claridad y atribución a autoridad competente.

La aquiescencia y el silencio

La aquiescencia es una aceptación inferida de la conducta o del silencio estatal; no depende necesariamente de una declaración formal. El silencio solo produce efectos jurídicos cuando las circunstancias permiten interpretarlo razonablemente como aceptación: conocimiento de la situación, oportunidad efectiva para protestar, interés jurídico, expectativas razonables y ausencia de protesta durante un período relevante. (Sobre esta materia, puede consultarse también de este mismo blog: https://www.dipcasosinternacionales.org/2023/03/la-naturaleza-juridica-de-la.html). 

El silencio no equivale automáticamente a consentimiento, y por eso requiere un análisis estricto.

Ejemplo territorial: el asunto del Templo de Preah Vihear (Camboya c. Tailandia), resuelto sobre el fondo el 15 de junio de 1962 (CIJ, Recueil 1962, p. 6), ilustra la relevancia de la aceptación de un mapa fronterizo, la conducta posterior y la ausencia prolongada de objeción. Es un supuesto relacionado con aceptación y conducta concluyente, no una promesa unilateral en sentido estricto.

IX. Los actos materiales y la soberanía territorial: el valor probatorio

Los actos unilaterales no se limitan a declaraciones verbales o escritas; también pueden comprender conductas oficiales que revelen una posición jurídica.

Ejemplo: Soberanía sobre Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks y South Ledge (Malasia/Singapur), fallo de 23 de mayo de 2008 (CIJ, Recueil 2008, p. 12). La Corte reconoció que el Sultanato de Johor tenía el título originario sobre Pedra Branca, pero concluyó que para 1980 este había pasado a Singapur, atendiendo a actos realizados por Singapur a título de soberano y a la falta de reacción de Malasia. Middle Rocks quedó bajo soberanía de Malasia; respecto de South Ledge, la soberanía corresponde al Estado en cuyas aguas territoriales se encuentre.

X. Las declaraciones en la delimitación territorial o marítima

En litigios territoriales y marítimos, las declaraciones estatales pueden:

• expresar una posición negociadora,

• reconocer una situación jurídica,

• renunciar a una pretensión,

• preservar un derecho mediante protesta,

• confirmar una práctica bilateral,

• o interpretar acuerdos anteriores.

Ejemplos:

Delimitación de la frontera marítima en la región del Golfo de Maine (Canadá/Estados Unidos), fallo de 12 de octubre de 1984 (CIJ, Recueil 1984, p. 246): la Sala examinó la aquiescencia y el estoppel como categorías vinculadas con la buena fe y la equidad, aunque basadas en razonamientos jurídicos distintos. El precedente sirve para diferenciar el reconocimiento tácito manifestado por la conducta de la preclusión propia del estoppel.

Controversia territorial y marítima (Nicaragua c. Colombia), fallo de 19 de noviembre de 2012 (CIJ, Recueil 2012, p. 624): la Corte atribuyó a Colombia la soberanía sobre las formaciones marítimas disputadas tras valorar sus actos públicos de administración a título de soberano y la ausencia de protesta nicaragüense antes de que la controversia se cristalizara. El caso es pertinente como ejemplo de conducta estatal y valor probatorio, más que como precedente directo sobre renuncia unilateral.

XI. Los compromisos procesales y los acuerdos internacionales informales

Los casos en los que existe concordancia de voluntades no deben presentarse como ejemplos de unilateralidad pura, pues el efecto jurídico deriva del acuerdo entre las partes.

Delimitación marítima y cuestiones territoriales entre Qatar y Baréin (Qatar c. Baréin), fallo sobre competencia y admisibilidad de 1 de julio de 1994 (CIJ, Recueil 1994, p. 112): la Corte consideró que los intercambios de cartas de 1987 y las Minutas de Doha de 1990 constituían acuerdos internacionales que creaban derechos y obligaciones para las partes. El precedente delimita con claridad la unilateralidad: cuando el efecto deriva de la coincidencia de voluntades, existe un acuerdo internacional, aunque no adopte la forma tradicional de tratado.

XII. Las declaraciones políticas y la obligación de negociar

La reiteración diplomática puede generar expectativas, pero no crea automáticamente una obligación jurídicamente exigible.

Obligación de negociar un acceso al océano Pacífico (Bolivia c. Chile), fallo de 1 de octubre de 2018 (CIJ, Recueil 2018, p. 507): la Corte examinó acuerdos, práctica diplomática y declaraciones atribuibles a autoridades chilenas, pero concluyó que ninguna de las bases invocadas establecía una obligación jurídica de negociar un acceso soberano al Pacífico. La reiteración política o la disposición al diálogo no sustituyen la prueba de un compromiso jurídico.

XIII. Los actos unilaterales en materia ambiental y las obligaciones colectivas

En materia ambiental, los actos unilaterales pueden aparecer como declaraciones o conductas relevantes (la prevención del daño transfronterizo, la conservación de los ecosistemas, las evaluaciones de impacto y la cooperación fronteriza), pero la obligación principal suele derivar de tratado o de Derecho internacional consuetudinario; el acto unilateral puede tener valor probatorio o interpretativo, o incluso comprometer al Estado cuando reúne los elementos de clarificación e intención objetiva.

Por ejemplo, en las obligaciones colectivas (genocidio, tortura, protección de derechos humanos), las declaraciones estatales pueden apoyar la interpretación o la prueba sin crear necesariamente una obligación unilateral sustantiva.

Otro ejemplo: Aplicación de la Convención para la Prevención y la Sanción del Delito de Genocidio (Gambia c. Myanmar), fallo de 22 de julio de 2022 sobre excepciones preliminares (CIJ, Recueil 2022, p. 477). La Corte confirmó la relevancia del interés común de los Estados partes en el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de la Convención. El asunto es útil para distinguir obligaciones convencionales erga omnes partes y elementos probatorios de eventuales actos unilaterales; no constituye, por sí mismo, un precedente central sobre la creación de obligaciones mediante declaraciones unilaterales.

XIV. La Comisión de Derecho Internacional: principios rectores

En 2006, la Comisión de Derecho Internacional, bajo la dirección del relator especial Víctor Rodríguez Cedeño, formuló los Principios rectores aplicables a las declaraciones unilaterales de los Estados capaces de crear obligaciones jurídicas (CDI, Informe de su 58.º período de sesiones, A/61/10, 2006, cap. IX).

Los principios esenciales se organizan así:

• las declaraciones públicas pueden crear obligaciones jurídicas,

• el efecto depende de la intención del Estado,

• deben ser claras y específicas,

• el contexto debe considerarse,

• la interpretación es restrictiva,

• la buena fe es fundamental,

• solo las autoridades competentes pueden obligar.

Además, el marco no pretende convertir todas las conductas estatales en actos unilaterales ni reproduce un régimen general idéntico al de los tratados: se circunscribe a declaraciones públicas con intención de obligarse.

XV. La interpretación, la validez y los vicios

La interpretación

La interpretación debe partir del texto y considerar el contexto. Para ampliar la metodología aplicable a documentos de diversa naturaleza, puede consultarse en este mismo blog el artículo enlazado a continuación. Algunos criterios relevantes:

• el texto (contenido del compromiso),

• el contexto (circunstancias de formulación),

• la autoridad (atribución),

• la publicidad,

• la conducta posterior,

• la reacción de terceros (expectativas),

• la buena fe.

Cuando la declaración limita la libertad de actuación del Estado, la interpretación debe ser restrictiva: no extender por analogía ni abarcar materias no comprendidas razonablemente.

La validez y los vicios

La validez depende de la libertad de formulación, la competencia y el conocimiento suficiente. Categorías útiles analíticamente (como criterios auxiliares) incluyen:

• el error esencial y determinante,

• el fraude (deformación deliberada por conducta de otro sujeto),

• la violación manifiesta de reglas internas fundamentales (como criterio analógico),

• la coacción (amenaza o uso de fuerza que elimina libertad decisoria).

XVI. Los efectos jurídicos del acto unilateral

Un acto unilateral puede producir:

• la creación de obligaciones (hacer/no hacer),

• la creación de derechos para terceros (exigibilidad correlativa),

• la renuncia (abandono de una pretensión o facultad),

• el reconocimiento (aceptación de una situación jurídica),

• la preservación de derechos (por ejemplo, como función de la protesta frente a aquiescencia),

• los efectos procesales (aceptación de jurisdicción),

• el valor probatorio o interpretativo.

El incumplimiento de una obligación válidamente asumida mediante un acto unilateral puede generar la responsabilidad internacional del Estado, conforme al régimen jurídico aplicable.

XVII. Excurso: medidas coercitivas unilaterales con efectos extraterritoriales

Dentro del estudio de los actos unilaterales, las medidas coercitivas unilaterales requieren un tratamiento diferenciado. Aunque pueden expresarse mediante declaraciones, órdenes administrativas o instrumentos financieros imputables a un solo Estado, pretenden producir consecuencias jurídicas y fácticas fuera de su ámbito interno. Su examen debe determinar si la medida se presenta como jurídicamente imponible, si procura generar deberes para terceros y si incide en las relaciones jurídicas más allá del territorio del Estado que la adopta. Por ello, además de los elementos constitutivos del acto unilateral —la manifestación externa, la imputabilidad, la claridad, la intención objetiva, la buena fe y la ausencia de vicios—, debe analizarse la estructura de los efectos que la medida pretende desplegar.

La nota determinante es su proyección extraterritorial. Cuando la medida afecta derechos o situaciones jurídicas de personas, empresas u otros Estados —mediante restricciones financieras, comerciales, migratorias o sancionatorias—, debe examinarse su compatibilidad con el Derecho internacional y su impacto sobre los derechos individuales. El análisis exige determinar si existe un título jurídico habilitante, si la medida interfiere ilegítimamente en la esfera jurídica de terceros y si su alcance resulta desproporcionado. Una medida situada fuera del marco jurídico de las retorsiones, contramedidas u otros regímenes aplicables puede constituir un hecho internacionalmente ilícito y generar responsabilidad internacional, con las correspondientes consecuencias diplomáticas o judiciales. Sobre esta cuestión puede consultarse también el artículo “Coerción sin derecho: la responsabilidad internacional”. En la medida en que se trate de un acto unilateral con efectos extraterritoriales y contenido antijurídico, puede generarse responsabilidad internacional sin que sea necesaria la concurrencia de todos los elementos antes examinados: basta con que configure una conducta que el Derecho internacional no admite.

Conclusiones

1. Los actos unilaterales de los Estados constituyen una categoría jurídicamente relevante, pero la existencia de obligación no se presume por la sola publicidad. La situación es distinta cuando se trata de conductas antijurídicas que vulneran la legalidad internacional.

2. La obligación surge cuando concurre una manifestación clara, precisa, pública y atribuible a una autoridad competente, que revela la intención objetiva de quedar jurídicamente obligado, formulada de buena fe y sin vicios relevantes.

3. El asunto Ensayos nucleares aporta el precedente central: confirma la fuerza jurídica de declaraciones adecuadas, pero no habilita una regla ilimitada de vinculación automática.

4. Las declaraciones jurisdiccionales ante la CIJ tienen efecto procesal: su eficacia depende de su texto, de las reservas, de la reciprocidad, de la materia, de la vigencia y de la relación entre las partes.

5. La conducta, el silencio, la protesta y los actos materiales pueden tener consecuencias jurídicas, especialmente como aquiescencia o aceptación inferida, pero no deben confundirse con promesas unilaterales sustantivas.

6. Los actos relacionados con tratados (ratificación, adhesión, reservas, denuncias) se rigen por el régimen convencional y no equivalen a actos unilaterales autónomos.

7. La Comisión de Derecho Internacional ofrece un marco metodológico centrado en la claridad, el contexto, la buena fe, la intención y la competencia de la autoridad, con interpretación restrictiva.

8. La coherencia interpretativa exige analizar siempre el texto, el contexto y la conducta posterior para determinar el alcance real del compromiso.

9. Las medidas coercitivas unilaterales con proyección externa exigen un escrutinio reforzado de legalidad. Las retorsiones, las contramedidas y las medidas adoptadas frente a amenazas a la paz cuentan con fundamentos, requisitos y límites propios en el Derecho internacional. Fuera de esos marcos, una medida no se legitima por la sola voluntad del Estado que la adopta y puede generar responsabilidad internacional por extender extraterritorialmente sus efectos. Cuando exista una amenaza o un quebrantamiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales, corresponde considerar las competencias atribuidas al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

Referencias oficiales

Comisión de Derecho Internacional. Principios rectores aplicables a las declaraciones unilaterales de los Estados capaces de crear obligaciones jurídicas, con comentarios. Informe de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional, 58.º período de sesiones, documento A/61/10, 2006, cap. IX.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Ensayos nucleares (Australia c. Francia), fallo de 20 de diciembre de 1974, Recueil 1974, p. 253.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Ensayos nucleares (Nueva Zelanda c. Francia), fallo de 20 de diciembre de 1974, Recueil 1974, p. 457.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Templo de Preah Vihear (Camboya c. Tailandia), fondo, fallo de 15 de junio de 1962, Recueil 1962, p. 6.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Delimitación de la frontera marítima en la región del Golfo de Maine (Canadá/Estados Unidos), fallo de 12 de octubre de 1984, Recueil 1984, p. 246.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Delimitación marítima y cuestiones territoriales entre Qatar y Baréin (Qatar c. Baréin), competencia y admisibilidad, fallo de 1 de julio de 1994, Recueil 1994, p. 112.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Pesquerías (España c. Canadá), competencia, fallo de 4 de diciembre de 1998, Recueil 1998, p. 432.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Actividades armadas en el territorio del Congo (República Democrática del Congo c. Uganda), fallo de 19 de diciembre de 2005, Recueil 2005, p. 168.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Soberanía sobre Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks y South Ledge (Malasia/Singapur), fallo de 23 de mayo de 2008, Recueil 2008, p. 12.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Controversia territorial y marítima (Nicaragua c. Colombia), fallo de 19 de noviembre de 2012, Recueil 2012, p. 624.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Obligación de negociar un acceso al océano Pacífico (Bolivia c. Chile), fallo de 1 de octubre de 2018, Recueil 2018, p. 507.

Corte Internacional de Justicia. Aplicación de la Convención para la Prevención y la Sanción del Delito de Genocidio (Gambia c. Myanmar), excepciones preliminares, fallo de 22 de julio de 2022, Recueil 2022, p. 477.


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martes, 29 de septiembre de 2026

Coercion Without Law: The International Responsibility of States for Unus Lateris Coercive Measures









"Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power."

Abraham Licoln


Prof. Dr. Carmelo Borrego






Introduction


Within the framework of the event organized by the American Association of Jurists, entitled “The Defense of the International Order against Fascism,” held in São Paulo, Brazil, I addressed one of the most urgent issues in contemporary international law: unilateral coercive measures, also referred to by some political and social sectors as measures of extortion. [1]


This intervention sought to offer a legal reflection on the legality, illegality, and international consequences of measures adopted unilaterally by certain States, as well as on the responsibility that may arise from their imposition, implementation, and extraterritorial enforcement.


The issue is not merely terminological. The use of expressions such as economic sanctions, restrictive measures, unilateral coercive measures, or extortion reflects different political and legal approaches to the same phenomenon: the use of economic, financial, commercial, technological, diplomatic, or administrative instruments for the purpose of modifying the conduct of another State, its authorities, or certain sectors of its population, without authorization from the United Nations Security Council and outside a previously established international jurisdictional framework.


The central question is whether a State may, through its domestic legislation, impose restrictions that produce effects beyond its territory; compel third States and foreign individuals to comply with its decisions; block assets; restrict essential transactions; or prevent access to goods indispensable to a country’s population. The answer requires confronting such practices with the structural principles of the international order, including the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention, the prohibition of the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and the prohibition of certain conduct contrary to peremptory norms of international law.


The thesis is that measures of extortion cannot be presumed lawful merely because they were adopted through a national legislative or administrative act. Their validity must be assessed in light of applicable international law. When such measures disregard international obligations, produce illegitimate extraterritorial effects, disproportionately affect the population, or are used as a mechanism of political pressure incompatible with the sovereignty of another State, they may constitute internationally wrongful acts and generate legal consequences for the State adopting them and, in certain circumstances, for those who implement or facilitate them.


It should be added that this is not the first time I have addressed this type of international case. This same blog already contains an article related to the subject, corresponding to a lecture delivered at a side event before the UN Human Rights Council. See: https://www.dipcasosinternacionales.org/2024/11/las-medidas-coercitivasindividuales-o.html.


1. Legal Nature of Unilateral Measures of Extortion


Unilateral measures of extortion generally have their formal origin in the domestic law of States. They may be established through statutes, decrees, regulations, executive orders, administrative decisions, financial provisions, or measures adopted by specialized agencies. However, the domestic origin of a decision does not, in itself, determine its international validity.


A domestic rule may be valid within the legal system that produces it and, at the same time, be incompatible with the international obligations of the State adopting it. Domestic legislation cannot be used as an automatic justification for failure to comply with an international obligation. Consequently, when a measure purports to affect persons, companies, property, financial transactions, or activities conducted outside the territory of the enacting State, it is essential to examine its compatibility with international law. [2]


The expression unilateral extortion, or coercive measures as they are commonly known, encompasses a broad range of practices. These include:

- Blocking or freezing public and private assets.

- Restrictions on foreign trade and financial transactions.

- Export or import prohibitions.

- Limitations on access to technology, medicines, food, fuel, or spare parts.

- Secondary sanctions directed against third States, companies, or individuals.

- Restrictions of a migratory, diplomatic, or administrative nature.

- Threats of inclusion on sanctions lists.

- Measures intended to prevent transactions with financial institutions in third countries.

- Obstacles to obtaining insurance, transportation, commercial intermediation, or essential services.


Not all these measures necessarily have the same legal nature. It is necessary to analyze, among other aspects, the body adopting them, their stated purpose, territorial scope, addressees, intensity of effects, the existence or absence of international authorization, and their compatibility with treaty obligations and customary law.


International law distinguishes between a State’s power to regulate conduct within its territory and an attempt to impose its decisions unilaterally beyond that territory. The latter possibility is limited by the principles of territorial sovereignty, sovereign equality, and non-intervention. The extraterritorial application of a measure does not become lawful merely because the adopting State possesses the economic, financial, or technological capacity to make it effective.


A distinction must also be drawn among foreign-policy measures, retorsion, and countermeasures. Retorsion consists of an unfriendly but lawful response to the unlawful conduct of another State. A countermeasure, by contrast, is a response that would, in principle, affect an international obligation, but whose wrongfulness may be precluded when the conditions established by international law governing State responsibility are strictly met. [3]


It follows that a measure cannot be regarded as a countermeasure merely because the imposing State so declares. For such a characterization to be legally defensible, there must be a prior internationally wrongful act attributable to the State against which the measure is directed; the measure must be directed against that State; it must be temporary in nature; it must be proportionate to the injury suffered; and it must cease when the responsible State complies with its obligations or the wrongful conduct comes to an end.


Moreover, countermeasures may not affect certain fundamental obligations. They may not violate the prohibition of the use of force, fundamental human rights obligations, humanitarian obligations prohibiting reprisals, or other peremptory norms of international law. Nor may they be used to impose a permanent change in rights or obligations or indefinitely replace institutional mechanisms for dispute settlement.


Accordingly, designating a measure as a “sanction” does not resolve its legal status. The decisive question is whether the measure falls within a competence recognized by international law, responds to an unfulfilled legal obligation, respects the applicable substantive and procedural limits, and produces effects compatible with the protection of the population, which is ultimately the most affected.


2. Applicable Regulatory Framework


The United Nations General Assembly entrusted the International Law Commission with developing a legal framework on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The principal result was the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the Commission in 2001 and taken note of by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001. [4]


The International Law Commission also developed the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted in 2011. Both instruments are draft articles and do not, in themselves, constitute general multilateral treaties in force. Their provisions nevertheless have considerable doctrinal and practical relevance because they largely reflect customary rules on attribution, breach, circumstances precluding wrongfulness, and the legal consequences of internationally wrongful acts.


Article 1 of the aforementioned draft established the fundamental principle that every internationally wrongful act of a State entails its international responsibility. Under Article 2, an internationally wrongful act exists when an act or omission:

- Is attributable to the State under international law.

- Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State.


Responsibility therefore does not depend on whether the act is unlawful under domestic law. What is decisive is the inconsistency between the State’s conduct and an international obligation binding upon it at the time the act occurs.


The relevant legal framework includes, among other sources:

- The Charter of the United Nations.

- The principle of the sovereign equality of States.

- The prohibition of the threat or use of force.

- The principle of non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States.

- The obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means.

- International human rights norms.

- International humanitarian law.

- Rules governing sovereign immunity.

- International economic and trade law.

- Customary international law.

- Obligations arising from bilateral and multilateral treaties.

- Peremptory norms of general international law.


The Charter of the United Nations establishes an institutional system for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council may take collective coercive measures under Chapter VII when it determines the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. This institutional competence is not equivalent to a general authorization for each State to adopt unilateral coercive measures with international effects.


The absence of Security Council authorization does not automatically render every unilateral measure unlawful, since international law permits certain responses by States in specific circumstances (in this regard, resolution 56/83 on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts). Such responses are not equivalent to a collective decision of the international community. The distinction among institutional action, legal response, and unilateral coercion is essential to preserving the structure of the Charter.


The non-binding nature of Resolution 56/83 does not diminish the relevance of the principles it contains. The analysis must proceed provision by provision because not all rules in the draft articles necessarily possess the same legal nature or normative force. In particular, rules concerning the prohibition of certain conduct, protection of fundamental rights, and observance of peremptory obligations may carry greater weight than merely dispositive rules. [5]


3. Extraterritoriality and the Prohibition of Intervention


One of the most problematic aspects of unilateral coercive measures is their extraterritorial dimension. A State may adopt decisions intended to regulate activities occurring within its territory or possessing a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with it. The situation changes, however, when it seeks to compel third States, foreign companies, or persons outside its territorial jurisdiction to comply with restrictions imposed unilaterally.


Extraterritoriality may manifest itself in different ways. It may take the form of directly applying a rule to events occurring outside the territory, threatening sanctions against foreign companies that trade with a third State, using dominant financial systems to prevent international transactions, or imposing restrictions on persons lacking a sufficient legal relationship with the sanctioning State.


Such practices must be examined in light of the principles of territorial jurisdiction, nationality, protective jurisdiction, and universality, as applicable. It is insufficient merely to show that a financial transaction passes through an institution located in the territory of the State applying the measure. It must be established whether that connection justifies, under international law, extending the prohibition to a transaction conducted essentially between third States.


Intervention may also occur through economic pressure. The prohibition of intervention is not limited to the use of military force. It includes coercive interference in matters that each State is entitled to determine freely in the exercise of its sovereignty. When an economic measure seeks to impose changes in another State’s political, economic, or social structure through the deliberate deprivation of indispensable resources, serious questions may arise regarding its compatibility with the principle of non-intervention.


The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, contained in General Assembly Resolution 2625, affirms that no State may use economic, political, or other measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or advantages of any kind. [6]


The legal analysis must therefore consider not only the measure’s form but also its purpose, enforcement mechanism, and foreseeable consequences. A measure may be presented as neutral financial regulation yet operate materially as an instrument of pressure intended to condition another State’s sovereign decisions.


4. Procedural Requirements and Means of Settlement


The existence of a dispute between States requires, first, recourse to the mechanisms of peaceful settlement provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 33 establishes that the parties shall seek a solution through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. [7]


This duty does not mean that States are required to accept a particular solution or that every dispute must necessarily be resolved by an international court. It means that unilateral coercion cannot automatically replace dialogue, negotiation, fact-finding, and the available institutional mechanisms.


A procedure compatible with international law should include, at a minimum, the following elements:

- Precise identification of the international obligation allegedly breached.

- A statement of the facts on which the claim is based.

- Formal communication to the allegedly responsible State.

- Submission of a request for cessation or reparation.

- Exploration of negotiated solutions.

- Assessment of mediation or conciliation mechanisms.

- Consideration of arbitration or judicial proceedings.

- Determination of the proportionality and temporariness of any response.

- Effective protection of the population and fundamental rights.

- Periodic review of the necessity and scope of the measure.


The absence of satisfactory negotiations does not, by itself, authorize the adoption of any measure. Nor does the failure of diplomacy permit disregard of the rules limiting countermeasures. The legality of a response must be examined in light of its substantive and procedural conditions.


A measure adopted outside these parameters may constitute an internationally wrongful act. Wrongfulness may arise from the absence of a prior act attributable to the target State, lack of proportionality, the permanent nature of the measure, infringement of fundamental rights, violation of obligations owed to third States, or breach of peremptory norms.


The peaceful settlement of disputes should not be understood as an empty formality. It is a safeguard against replacing law with the imposition of economic, financial, or technological power. The requirement of transparent procedures also makes it possible to determine who made the decision, its legal basis, the purpose pursued, and what assessment was made of its humanitarian consequences.

 

5. Legal Consequences: International Responsibility of the State


The commission of an internationally wrongful act entails international responsibility. Such responsibility has consequences distinct from domestic civil liability and must not be confused with individual criminal responsibility.

The international responsibility of the State may entail:

- Investigation of the facts.

- Cessation of the wrongful act.

- Guarantees of non-repetition.

- Restitution, where materially possible.

- Compensation for financially assessable damage.

- Satisfaction for the moral or legal injury caused.

- Acknowledgment of the breach.

- Repeal or amendment of measures incompatible with international law.

- Full reparation for victims.


Restitution seeks to re-establish, insofar as possible, the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed. Where restitution is impossible or insufficient, compensation is appropriate. This may include material damage, economic losses, deterioration of infrastructure, damage to public services, loss of revenue, and other demonstrable harm.


Reparation may also encompass harm arising from impacts on economic, social, and cultural rights. When a measure impedes access to medicines, food, fuel, medical equipment, spare parts, or essential technologies, the assessment of harm should not be limited to commercial losses. It must consider consequences for life, health, education, food, housing, development, and human dignity.


The attribution of responsibility requires determining which organs, entities, or agents acted on behalf of the State. Decisions by ministries, central banks, financial supervisory bodies, administrative agencies, diplomatic services, and other public institutions may be attributed to the State under international law. The conduct of entities empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority may also be attributable, even where they formally operate with administrative autonomy.


A State cannot be exempted by alleging that the measure was taken by an independent body if, under international law, the conduct is attributable to it. Similarly, the internal division of competences cannot be used to evade international responsibility.


6. Peremptory Norms and Obligations Owed to the International Community


Jus cogens, or peremptory law, consists of norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted and which may be modified only by a subsequent norm of the same character.


Norms generally associated with this category include the prohibitions of genocide, slavery, torture, aggression, and certain international crimes. Identifying a norm as peremptory requires rigorous legal analysis and cannot be asserted solely on the basis of a political declaration.


The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. Likewise, a treaty becomes void and terminates if a new peremptory norm emerges with which it conflicts. Although unilateral coercive measures, by their nature, are unilateral acts and therefore do not fall within the category of treaties, these rules serve by analogy in evaluating the unlawfulness and invalidity of any act producing extraterritorial effects against another State.


The existence of peremptory norms also has consequences for unilateral coercive measures. First, it prevents States from invoking domestic or international agreements to justify breaches of fundamental obligations. Second, it limits the possibility of taking countermeasures that affect those obligations. Third, it activates duties of cooperation to bring situations created by serious breaches to an end.


A distinction must nevertheless be drawn between a violation of human rights and a violation of a specific norm of jus cogens. Any violation of a peremptory norm constitutes a particularly serious breach, but not every human rights violation can automatically be classified as a violation of an erga omnes norm. This clarification does not diminish the gravity of the harm caused; rather, it prevents the category from being used without an adequate legal basis.


Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and international jurisprudence provide relevant elements for analyzing these obligations. [8] The International Court of Justice has recognized the existence of obligations enforceable vis-à-vis all States in certain fields, although identifying an obligation as erga omnes does not automatically establish that it has the character of jus cogens.


This distinction is central. An erga omnes obligation is one whose performance is of legal interest to the international community as a whole. A peremptory norm, moreover, permits no derogation by contrary agreement. The two categories may overlap in some cases, but they are not identical.

 

7. Aggravated Wrongfulness and the Criminal-Law Dimension


When a unilateral coercive measure violates an international obligation and also produces grave consequences for fundamental rights or the survival of a population, it may be described as an international wrong of particular gravity. Gravity must be determined according to the nature of the obligation breached, the intensity, duration, and scope of the conduct, the foreseeability of its effects, and the circumstances of the persons affected.


The aggravated responsibility of a State does not automatically amount to individual criminal responsibility. International law distinguishes among:

- The international responsibility of the State.

- The administrative or civil liability of legal persons.

- Individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.

- The disciplinary or political responsibility of officials.


An unlawful economic measure does not in itself constitute a crime against humanity. For conduct to fall within Article 7 of the Rome Statute, all elements of the crime must be fulfilled. In particular, the acts must form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy, and the perpetrator must act with the knowledge required by the Statute. [9]


Article 7 encompasses, among other acts, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts. Extermination may include the intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. The legal framework nevertheless requires proof of intent and the other contextual elements. This is plainly a procedural matter involving proof through the necessary evidentiary material to establish the objective elements of the offence, the nexus of culpability, and the other elements identifying the person responsible for criminal purposes.


For that reason, the assertion that certain coercive measures constitute crimes against humanity must be based on concrete evidence and a determination that the criminal elements are met. The decision to impose the measure, knowledge of its effects, the availability of reasonable alternatives, the anticipated harm to the civilian population, refusal to establish effective humanitarian exceptions, and the causal relationship between the measure and the consequences produced must all be analyzed.


Reports of the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights have expressed concern about the effects of such measures on economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as their humanitarian consequences. [10] These reports are relevant for documenting impacts, identifying patterns, and formulating recommendations, although their existence does not replace a judicial determination of criminal responsibility.


Individual criminal responsibility may extend to persons who order, design, implement, or facilitate an unlawful policy where their conduct satisfies the elements of an international crime. Official capacity does not exclude individual responsibility. Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that official status neither exempts a person from criminal responsibility nor constitutes, in itself, a ground for reduction of sentence. [11]


8. The Impact on Human Rights

Unilateral coercive measures must also be examined from a human rights perspective. Their impact may arise directly, when a measure expressly prohibits an indispensable activity, or indirectly, when it creates a set of obstacles that prevents effective access to essential goods and services.


Rights potentially affected include:

- The right to life.

- The right to health.

- The right to food.

- The right to water.

- The right to education.

- The right to work.

- The right to social security.

- The right to development.

- The right to science and its benefits.

- The right to culture.

- The right to housing.

- The right to an adequate standard of living.


The assessment must incorporate the principle of non-discrimination. General measures may have differentiated effects on children, older persons, persons with disabilities, chronically ill patients, pregnant women, rural communities, and vulnerable sectors. The existence of formal exceptions for food or medicines does not in itself guarantee that such goods can be effectively purchased, transported, insured, financed, and distributed.


So-called overcompliance by banks, transportation companies, insurers, technology providers, and humanitarian organizations must also be assessed. Legal uncertainty and fear of secondary sanctions may lead these actors to cancel legitimate operations even when they are formally authorized by humanitarian licences or exceptions.


In such cases, the measure produces effects broader than those contemplated in its formal text. The legality analysis must consider the actual operation of the regime, not only the exceptions contained in the regulations. An exception that cannot be used because of financial, administrative, or logistical obstacles may be insufficient to protect the rights affected.


The obligation to respect human rights does not disappear when State conduct occurs outside national territory. The scope of extraterritorial obligations will depend on the applicable legal source, the degree of control or influence exercised, and the relationship between the State’s conduct and the harm caused. In any event, the State cannot entirely disregard the foreseeable consequences of its decisions for populations subject to its economic or financial power.


9. The Case of Venezuela and the Effects of Coercive Measures


Venezuela has been one of the countries most affected by regimes of unilateral coercive measures. These measures have affected its financial operations, exports, imports, access to credit, acquisition of essential goods, infrastructure maintenance, transportation, energy production, and institutional response capacity.


The effects of the measures should not be examined in isolation from other factors that may also influence a country’s economic and social situation. A legally sound assessment must distinguish among consequences directly attributable to a specific measure, the cumulative effects of different restrictive regimes, difficulties in domestic governance, and external economic or geopolitical factors.


Research conducted by Elsie Rosales and Yosmer Arellán Zurita has documented, through empirical data, the harmful effects of sanctions on the Venezuelan population. [12] In 2021, during an international event involving internationally renowned jurists, findings were presented concerning economic contraction, the unavailability of medicines, inadequate access to food, the provision of basic services, and other dimensions of daily life.


The use of empirical data is therefore indispensable to establishing international responsibility; it is not enough to assert that a measure is politically unjust. The conjunction of factors must demonstrate:

- The existence and content of the measure.

- The agency or State that adopted it.

- The conduct of the entities that implemented it.

- The jurisdictional or extraterritorial nexus.

- The assets, sectors, or persons affected.

- The foreseeability of the consequences.

- The causal relationship between the measure and the harm.

- The existence of less harmful alternatives.

- The duration and cumulative effect of the restrictions.

- The absence or insufficiency of humanitarian mechanisms.


As part of its legal and political response, Venezuela submitted communications and documents to international bodies, including the International Criminal Court. The situation concerning Venezuela was the subject of proceedings by the Office of the Prosecutor within the jurisdictional framework established by the Rome Statute. However, the matter did not progress beyond the preliminary examination stage.


It is nevertheless maintained that the International Criminal Court may exercise jurisdiction in the circumstances provided for by the Rome Statute. These include crimes committed in the territory of a State Party (so-called effects-based jurisdiction), crimes committed by nationals of a State Party, and certain situations referred by the Security Council. The fact that the allegedly responsible State is outside the Rome system does not automatically exclude jurisdiction, but neither does it establish jurisdiction by itself. [13]


The question of unilateral coercive measures before international criminal jurisdiction clearly requires proof that the acts constitute one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. Political debate concerning the unlawfulness or injustice of sanctions must be translated into a specific criminal-law argument based on the objective and subjective elements of each crime.


10. Responsibility of the State Adopting Unilateral Coercive Measures


A State that designs, approves, imposes, and maintains a coercive measure may incur international responsibility if its conduct violates an obligation binding upon it. Responsibility may arise both from the initial act and from the continuation of its effects, particularly when the State is aware of the measure’s humanitarian impact and refuses to amend or suspend it.


Responsibility may arise from:

- Adoption of a measure without a sufficient basis in international law.

- Extraterritorial application of domestic legislation.

- Violation of obligations of non-intervention.

- Failure to comply with human rights obligations.

- Violation of sovereign immunities.

- Infringement of the rights of third States.

- Imposition of secondary sanctions.

- Obstruction of humanitarian operations.

- Refusal to establish effective exceptions.

- Continuation of the measure after its basis has ceased to exist.


The assessment must consider both the stated and the actual purpose. A measure may be presented as an instrument for promoting human rights and yet cause widespread harm to the civilian population. Protective rhetoric does not relieve the State of demonstrating that the measure is necessary, proportionate, legally grounded, and compatible with its other international obligations.


11. Responsibility of Officials, Companies, and Cooperating States


Responsibility is not necessarily limited to the State formally issuing the measures. The conduct of officials, agencies, companies, and third States involved in or facilitating their implementation must also be examined.


At the State level, a third State may incur responsibility if it aids or assists in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, provided that it acts with knowledge of the circumstances of the act and that the conduct would also have been wrongful had it committed the act itself. This rule requires a specific analysis of the degree of involvement, the information available, and the nature of the assistance provided.


Not every commercial or administrative relationship with a sanctions regime automatically entails international responsibility. A legally relevant contribution must be demonstrated. The mere existence of economic ties may be insufficient; coordinated asset freezes, the deliberate interruption of essential supplies, or the knowing enforcement of a manifestly unlawful measure may present a different case. A causal relationship between these factors and the harmful result of the measure or measures is indispensable.


The United States, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control and other financial agencies, and the European Union, through their respective regulatory instruments, have applied regimes of restrictive measures producing international effects. The legality of these actions must be assessed separately for each regime, agency, measure, and target. It is inappropriate to attribute identical legal consequences to different provisions without examining their content and scope. Nevertheless, these entities have caused the greatest harmful effects on the population.


The European Union and its Member States, for example, may adopt restrictive measures within their domestic legal competences. Such measures are nevertheless also subject to international obligations, including protection of fundamental rights, legality, proportionality, respect for due process, and compatibility with general international law.


Private companies occupy a complex position. In principle, their conduct is not automatically attributable to a State. Attribution may nevertheless arise when they act under State instructions, direction, or control; exercise elements of governmental authority; or are functionally integrated into the implementation of State policy. In the criminal sphere, responsibility will depend on individual conduct and the elements of the relevant offence.


The responsibility of officials who design or implement the measures must also be considered. Individual responsibility may arise from ordering, authorizing, facilitating, or intentionally carrying out conduct constituting international crimes. Functional immunity or hierarchical position cannot be used as a general explanation for excluding responsibility when the requirements of international criminal law are met. [14]


12. Causation and Proof of Harm


One of the greatest challenges in any international proceeding is proving the causal link between the measure and the alleged harm. The existence of a coercive measure and the simultaneous existence of an economic crisis are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish legal causation.

The evidence must be developed using a methodology capable of identifying:

- The situation existing before adoption of the measure.

- The time at which the measure began to produce effects.

- The intensity and duration of the restrictions.

- The activities or assets directly affected.

- Decisions by banks, companies, and suppliers.

- The cumulative effects of successive measures.

- The existence of independent economic factors.

- The actual availability of humanitarian exceptions.

- The foreseeability of the harm.

- The subsequent conduct of the sanctioning State.


Causation may be direct or concurrent. Harm may result from a combination of several causes without necessarily eliminating a State’s responsibility. In such cases, the analysis must determine each factor’s contribution, the foreseeability of the consequences, and the degree of control each actor exercised over the outcome.


Evidence may include official documents, foreign-trade data, banking records, cancelled contracts, medical reports, mortality statistics, testimony, diplomatic communications, administrative decisions, economic analyses, and sectoral studies. Evidence concerning the effects of secondary sanctions and private overcompliance may also be used.


A sound argument must avoid two extremes. The first is attributing all economic problems to external measures without examining other factors. The second is denying any causal relationship because internal or structural factors exist. The law of responsibility requires a concrete, evidence-based, and differentiated analysis.


13. Full Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Repetition


Reparation should not be reduced to financial compensation. In cases involving unilateral coercive measures, full reparation may include:

- Removal or amendment of the unlawful measure.

- Elimination of secondary sanctions incompatible with international law.

- Restitution of property, where applicable.

- Compensation for material and moral damage.

- Reconstruction of affected infrastructure.

- Restoration of essential services.

- Ensuring access to medicines and food.

- Review of humanitarian licences and exceptions.

- Investigation of the harm caused.

- Public acknowledgment of the breach.

- Adoption of measures to prevent recurrence.


Cessation is especially important while the measure continues to produce effects. Future reparation would be meaningless if the State simultaneously maintained the wrongful conduct. The first duty is therefore to end the breach when it is continuing in character.


Guarantees of non-repetition may require legislative, administrative, or institutional changes. They may also include supervisory mechanisms, prior humanitarian-impact assessments, judicial review, transparent decision-making, consultation with international agencies, and procedures for resolving complaints by affected third States and individuals.


At this point, reparation is linked to the effectiveness of international law. It is not enough to recognize an obligation in the abstract; mechanisms must be established to identify the violation, attribute responsibility, order cessation, and obtain reparation. The absence of effective mechanisms favors the discretion of States possessing greater economic and financial capacity.


14. The Enforcement Deficit in International Law


The contemporary regime of international responsibility faces a structural difficulty: the existence of rules is not always accompanied by compulsory and accessible mechanisms for their enforcement.


International responsibility often depends on State consent to jurisdiction, the availability of claims mechanisms, and the political will of States. This situation may create a gap between the proclamation of rights and their effective protection.


The deficit is especially notable in three areas:

- The difficulty of bringing States applying coercive measures before courts or tribunals.

- The absence of automatic reparation mechanisms.

- The lack of universal procedures for assessing the humanitarian impact of measures.


This limitation has a direct impact on the right to peace, the right to development, and the international protection of human rights. The legal order may recognize fundamental principles while leaving their application subject to the will of the most powerful States.


The question is not only whether a measure is legally unlawful. It is also necessary to ask who may declare that unlawfulness, which body may order cessation, how harm is proved, who guarantees reparation, and what consequences the responsible State faces when it fails to comply.


Consolidating an international order based on human dignity requires progress toward more effective forms of oversight. These include:

- Jurisdictional mechanisms with sufficient competence.

- Interstate and individual complaint procedures.

- Mandatory humanitarian-impact assessments.

- Periodic review of measures.

- Enhanced protection of essential goods.

- Effective prohibition of secondary sanctions.

- International reparation systems.

- Greater transparency in decision-making.

- Participation by affected States and civil society.

- Coordination among bodies concerned with human rights, trade, and peace and security.


Conclusion


Unilateral coercive measures cannot be excluded from scrutiny under international law merely because they were adopted through domestic statutes, decrees, or administrative decisions. When they produce extraterritorial effects, interfere with another State’s exercise of sovereignty, affect fundamental rights, or are maintained without a sufficient basis in international law, they may give rise to internationally wrongful acts.

Determining responsibility requires a specific analysis of each measure. Its legal basis, purpose, territorial scope, responsible authority, compatibility with the Charter of the United Nations, relationship to a possible countermeasure, proportionality, temporariness, humanitarian impact, and consequences for third States and individuals must be examined.

The international responsibility of the State may give rise to duties of cessation, restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. Separately, individual criminal responsibility may arise when conduct satisfies the elements of an international crime, without the perpetrator’s official status constituting an automatic defense.

In the case of Venezuela, the analysis must be supported by empirical evidence documenting the effects of the measures on the economy, health, food, education, science, culture, public services, and development. It must also distinguish between consequences attributable to external measures and those arising from other factors. A sound legal case need not simplify reality; it must demonstrate it with precision.

The international community cannot remain indifferent to the use of economic coercion as a substitute for legal and diplomatic procedures. Nor can it accept the invocation of human rights as justification for measures that, in their concrete implementation, cause widespread suffering among the population.

The principle of sovereign equality requires that no State transform its financial, technological, or commercial power into a general power to dictate rules to the rest of the international community. International cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, responsibility, and reparation must prevail over threats, blockades, and arbitrary coercion.

The international judicial avenue, although complex and limited by jurisdictional rules, remains a necessary tool. It must, however, be complemented by political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and multilateral mechanisms capable of preventing harm and ensuring timely responses.

The debate on unilateral coercive measures is not merely a debate about economic sanctions. It concerns the limits of State power, the effectiveness of international law, the protection of peoples, and the possibility of building an international order in which sovereignty is not a privilege of the strongest but a guarantee of equality among States.

From this forum, we reaffirm our commitment to the rigorous study of these practices, the defense of victims, and the construction of an international order founded on law, cooperation, peace, development, and human dignity—not on unilateral coercion or arbitrary imposition.


Thank you very much for your attention.



Notes

[1]: The expression “measures of extortion” has been used by various States, social organizations, and academic sectors to emphasize the abusive, disproportionate, or coercive nature of certain unilateral measures. In the institutional language of the United Nations, the expression “unilateral coercive measures” predominates. The use of either term should be explained so that terminological differences do not obscure the underlying legal problem.


[2]: Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Although the rule refers directly to treaty obligations, it expresses a general principle: domestic law cannot prevail over the international obligations of the State.

[3]: Retorsion is an unfriendly but, in principle, lawful measure. Countermeasures are responses to a prior internationally wrongful act and may be invoked only when they satisfy strict conditions, including proportionality, temporariness, and the purpose of inducing the responsible State to comply with its obligations. See Articles 22 and 49–54 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, 2001.

[4]: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, which takes note of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and commends them to the attention of Governments.

[5]: Jus cogens is defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as one from which no derogation is permitted and which may be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

[6]: General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 24 October 1970 contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Its formulation concerning economic coercion must be read together with State practice, doctrine, and other applicable sources of international law.

[7]: Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations mentions, among other means, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or arrangements.

[8]: The International Court of Justice has examined the existence of obligations owed to the international community in cases such as Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment of 5 February 1970. Reference to peremptory or imperative norms requires a different and more stringent analysis than the identification of erga omnes obligations.

[9]: Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity. Their commission requires, among other elements, that the acts form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and that the perpetrator act with knowledge of that attack. The political or economic gravity of a measure is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute this crime.

[10]: The Office of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights has prepared reports on their effects on economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as their humanitarian consequences. Resolutions and reports of special procedures are relevant sources of documentation and assessment, although they do not replace a jurisdictional determination of responsibility.

[11]: Article 27 of the Rome Statute establishes the irrelevance of official capacity before the International Criminal Court. Individual criminal responsibility requires, in every case, proof of the objective and subjective elements of the alleged crime.

[12]: Studies by Elsie Rosales and Arellán Zurita have addressed the effects of coercive measures on Venezuela’s economic and social indicators, including gross domestic product, access to medicines, food availability, and the provision of basic services. A final academic version should include complete bibliographic references, methodology, the period analyzed, and the criteria used to attribute causation.

[13]: Article 12 of the Rome Statute establishes the preconditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be based, among other grounds, on territoriality, the nationality of the accused, or a Security Council referral. The procedural status of a communication, examination, or investigation must be described precisely and consistently with the officially recognized stage.

[14]: Attribution of conduct to a State and individual criminal responsibility are distinct matters. The former is governed by the rules of international responsibility of States; the latter requires proof of individual participation, knowledge, and the other elements of the crime prescribed by international criminal law.


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